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• FEDERALIZING THE ADMINISTRATION OF MEDICAID 
This chapter presents an argument for the federal domination of Medicaid 
Administration. Unlike the other chapters, this one includes no counterpoint, 
no position paper exploring state control of Medicaid Administration due to one 
participant's inability to sufficiently research the area. While we consider 
the omission a serious one, there are a few mitigating circumstances. First, 
the state control perspective is essentially an argument for the status quo 
which suggests that little which is fresh or innovative would be included. 
Second, the system of state control for large federally-funded programs that 
provide local services has been extant in this country for the past decade. 
Two notable examples, the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act (CETA) and 
• Community Development Block Grants, have long provided us with state control 
management models. 
This chapter starts with a brief account of the role played by the 
states in the administration of Medicaid. The remainder of the chapter, 
devoted to building a case for a federally-administered program, investigates 
thoroughly such areas as ability to respond to the needs of long-term care 
clients, efficiency, and cost containment under federal control. 
States as Administrators 
Robert Derzon, former head of the Health Care Financing Administration, 
told a conference of state administrators, "The job of designing and managing 
a state Medicaid program is extremely complicated--far more so than practically 
h ·· . ,,1 T' any ot er state actlvlty you supervlse or operate . here are arguments 
• which suggest that many states cannot in fact operate such a complicated 
program well. 
It is because states have been considered to be weak administratively 
• 
• 
• 
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that the federal government has attempted to aid state administrative functioning 
through the grant system. Michael Reagan, an authority on American Federalism, 
2 describes eight purposes of federal grants, of which five relate to the adminis-
trative function: 
(1) Achievement of minimal standards in programs which exist in states 
at widely differing levels. 
(2) Achievement of a critical mass in a given area and avoidance of waste-
ful state duplication. (i.e., regionalization and economies of scale.) 
(3) Improvement of substantive adequacy of state programs through profes-
sianal technical assistance, because only a few states are able to compete with 
the national government in attracting outstandin~ talent. 
(4) The stimlllation of experimentation for programs and methods which can then 
be applied nationally to better achieve program goals . (Reagan notes that most 
such experiments did not well up from the local level. They were, instead" man-
dated by the federal government. Sometimes experimentation can only be started 
at the local level if directed from above, owing to the status quo orientation 
of local elites.)3 
(5) The improvemeTlt of state and local administrative structure and opera-
tion. Since the 1930's, federal granxs have been important in inducing grant-
receiving governments to professionalize their organizational structure and 
practices. Reagan suggests that "While a few states have always been the equal 
of the national government .... the majority of states have been laggard in 
4 
adopting modern management knowledge"" 
State administrative capability may be divided into three areas of consi-
deration: administrative capacity and technological capacity, political 
capacity, and degree of domination by special interest groups . 
(1) Administrative capacity refers to staffing patterns and presence of 
• 
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sufficient staff to do the job while technological capacity is concerned with 
the use of a computer or other system which promotes economies of scale in 
larger operations. Poor administrative and technological capacity can under-
mine the success of a Federal grant system. Jeffery Pressman, writing on 
the political implications of the New Federalism, cites a growing skepticism 
over the success of revenue sharing resulting from a perceived lack of 
capacity among states in the areas of planning, personnel, and management~ The 
Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations (ACIR) evidences a similar 
skepticism concerning the efficacy of federal social intervention grants, for 
successful implementation at the stat'e and local level~ depends on the political 
leadership and the management strength of the localities. 6 
These suspicions are not unfounded. In the area of administrative 
• capacity, for example, the Ohio State Budget for 1976-77 listed only 70 people 
employed in the entire AFDC (welfare) program. 7 Even New York State, still 
wealthy by any standards, and long considered a leader among state administra-
• 
tions, has its problems. In a recent interview, an official in the New York 
State office handling hospitals and nursing homes stated that administrative 
costs in the state were not only not high, but in fact the managerial staffing 
pattern had long since been cut as "thin" as possible. The relevant question 
is, at what point does a reduction in manpower cost more in inefficiency and 
ineffectiveness than the salaries it saves? 
There is also inefficiency in the area of technological capacity. CUT-
rent ly, even with the prospect of ninety pe'rcent federal financing for capi tal 
installation of high technology data processing systems, and seventy-five percent 
reimbursement for their operation, not all states have taken steps to initiate 
such data systems. The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has 
created a model Medicaid Management Information System (MMIS) for state data 
• 
• 
• 
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systems to follow. After six years of the program, only 15 states have an 
MMIS in full operation, and 32 MMIS programs are planned. A full six states 
have no plans for an MMIS at this time. 8 (Total includes territories.) 
(2) The second division of administrative capability, "Political 
capacity" refers to the existence of a well-developed political syste~, formal 
and informal, which can effectively foster programs and monitor their implemen-
tation, particularly in the case of new or changed programs. In this area, 
too, there are problems which contribute to less than optimum operation at the 
state level. Reagan charges that many state legislatures are characterized by 
9 
low pay, too frequent turnover, and a tendency to hamstring their Governor. 
In fact, one-third of our state legislatures do not meet in regular sessions 
every year . 
(3) The third area of admininistrative capability, the question of the 
domination of states by special interest groups, (SIGs) has two aspects. First, 
such groups may consist of organizations lobbying for a particular cause. These 
types of interest groups are positive or negative depending on the perspective 
of the observer, but, it can be agreed that no one group should have excessive 
influence over a legislative body. In general, observers seems to believe that 
special interest groups are stronger in states than in Washington. For example, 
it has been charged that currently, many state legislatures are dominated by 
. . 10 . I fl' f f hI' 1 t' . lnsurance lnterests, certaln yore evance 1 any urt er egls a lon concernlng 
government-financed health insurance is considered. 
State governments have also been accus'ed of domination by interest groups 
in the second sense of that term, that is, as the existing informal economic 
power structure of the community . It is to this latter sense which Pressman 
refers when he summarizes several studies which are critical of state government. 
He reports that states were found to be "unresponsive, institutionally weak, of 
• 
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11 low visibility, and dominated by narrow economic interest groups!!, 
A specific example of what can happen under such local control is evi-
denced in the Comprehensive Employment and Training Act of 1973 (CETA), 
a revenue-sharing grant. CETA replaced earlier categorical programs in 
manpower training and it was hoped that creative planning would take place 
through the required "manpower plans", 
:j 
Instead, an interim evaluation of 
12 CETA showed that manpower programs were being politicized, that "planning" 
tended to follow rather than lead the action stage, and that the responsibi-
lities of administration were clearly straining the capabilities of local 
governments. Over 40 percent of the units submitting plans were intially 
assessed as performing marginally. In addition to these problems within 
localities, there were responses in the larger system. Congress began to 
• return to categorical funding in certain sub-areas of manpower, such as youth, 
because of the need it perceived to address them as "national px:oblems." The 
analogy to health is clear in the conflict between local administrative 
control and achievement of national purpose, even under conditions of full and 
adequate financing. 
Although the states are weak in administrative capability and are thus 
unable to operate a complicated program such as Medicaid, the states themselves 
often lay blame at the feet of the federal government. They complain of a 
nightmare of excessive paperwork, overly-detailed, repetitive, rigid and 
incomplete regulations as well as excessive concern with proofs of compliance 
over actual service activities. Yet, the states themselves are frequently 
guilty of the same thing. For example, block grants were instituted to aid 
localities with a minimum of federal intervention . In the case of the Safe 
• Streets Act of 1968, "four-fifths of the states have adopted policies that 
• 
• 
• 
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exclude certain activities from funding and encourage others, with the result 
of reducing local flexibilityl!~3 Although approvals of amendments to the 
state plan can be obtained, "the amount of time and paperwork involved ... often 
leaves local officials believing that block grant ... decisions are, at best, 
a ritual". 14 
The "red tape" the states complain of is misleading, at least insofar as 
it happens that many of the admittedly difficult regulations are not about 
program requirements per see They are often about important new national ob-
jectives in fields related chiefly through the administrative function, such 
as environmental protection and equal employment. IS (J 
Federal Administration in Health is Required to Achieve Cost Containment 
The concept of natural area was first put forth by James Fesler. Basing 
his arguments on economics and geography, he proposed that the country could 
be divided in any number of different ways, depending on the category or 
factor selected; for example, rainfall, or the density of the elderly popu-
lation. The natural or obvious division lines for one factor would not neces-
sarily match the divisions laid down for another. If problems in society, 
then, can reveal their own natural regions for handling, we should not be 
surprised if liThe legal areas of particular governments seldom coincide with 
or wholly embrace the natural areas defined by the problems with which society 
16 
must deal,!! We may extend his ideas to suggest that our familiar political 
subdivisions can actually obscure our vision of the"natural area" of a problem, 
since we simply assume that it will coincide with the boundaries of those 
subdivisions. In health, they are presently the states . 
Fesler himself was thinking mainly of two models for "natural areas" 
beyond the state and local levels: the ad hoc organization of the Tennessee 
Valley Authority, and the federal government. Although he did not uniformly 
federalization of programs, he clearly recognized the value of the 
• 
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central government. 
Health is a problem whose natural area has indeed become national. 
We have seen that providing access to health care is becoming a national 
priority. It would appear that if we wish to guarantee access to minimum 
levels of health care to all our citizens, we will have to be willing to pay 
the bill from the federal treasury_ But would it be sufficient to finance 
health insurance as a grant at a rate of 90 or even 100 percent to effectively 
induce more uniform state participation? Such financing would be insuffi-
cient, because in the absence of state control" the re.cesssary other half of 
a federal health care system would suffer: cost containment. 
Cost containment, in terms of expenditures of public funds, necessitates 
rational planning and controls to obtain maximal value for the taxpayers' 
• dollars. We may wish to limit the amount of these dollars spent, or we may 
• 
collectively decide to spend more if we lik~what we are getting for our 
money. Cost containment means more, however, in terms of the health care 
system as a whole. It means resource containment: health care is like any 
market~ in that demand is always potentially infinite. Resource5, no matter 
how abundant, are scarce in the face of potential demand. No society can 
have all the health care it can possibly consume. 
Currently, health resources are allocated in part by some states 1 
relative unwillingness to finance access to health resources for all of their 
people. If the federal government steps in to increase their access by 
adopting the proposed medical insurance plan, or takes an even broader step 
to guarantee that financial access to all of us through national health 
insurance, we will quickly face the dilemma long ago anticipated by the 
Committee on the Costs of Medical Care. First, demand may increase beyond the 
supply capacity of our present health systems, resulting in rationing by 
• 
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queues or lack of access to some individuals for arbitrary reasons. Second, 
the system may expand to meet the demand, but for a price in public expenditures 
which would be far in excess of our willingness to pay. In sum, government 
financing will create demand pressures which will require vigorous measures 
to contain. 
A national program to plan the distribution of resources and to ensure 
the careful use of available health resources is thus necessary for the success 
of federal financing of health for the poor and elderly. The need for rational 
health planning has been foreseen and acted upon by Congress in one guise, the 
creation of Health Systems Agencies (HSAs), independent regional agencies acting 
under federal authority to study and plan for local health needs. Other cost 
control measures are essentially administrative in nature. Ensuring efficient 
• delivery of services, overseeing appropriateness of utilization, and setting 
fair but not excess wage rates are but a few examples. Finally, the systems 
of health financing and administrative controls must be effectively linked with 
the planning by the HSAs, and it is likely that federal administrators would 
• 
be the more motivated to work cooperatively with the federally-sponsored HSAs. 
Why can we not leave states to initiate vigorous cost control measures on 
their own? The record shows that states are variable in every respect, and 
for the reasons outlined in previous sections, will be variable in their res-
ponse to cost containment as well. If some states participated in control 
efforts, there would be improvement, but the result will be far less than it 
should be from the number or strength of the states involved. The energetic 
efforts of the states which move forward in financing, planning, or controlling 
health care will be drained off by those which do not. This is because health 
is an action area characterized by significant economic externalities--that is, 
health policies in one state have significant fiscal impacts on other states. 
• 
• 
• 
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Externalities occur when the action taken by an individual decision-
making unit imposes unavoidable (and usually unplanned) benefits or costs 
on others, and no feasible method of compensation in return can be arranged. 
Fuchs gives the example of vaccinations. Not only do they protect the reci-
pients again a communicable disease, they also collectively reduce the 
chances of an epidemic and thus the chances of unimmunized persons getting 
the disease. 17 Conversely, consider the impact on a pregnant woman living 
near the border of a state which did not provide a preschool rubella irnmuni-
zation program. 
Externalities take place equally in cost containment and in provision of 
care. Physicians in particular may well migrate to obtain higher status and 
salaries where individual states institute measures to limit their fee schedules 
or induce them to work in cooperative arrangments such as HMO's. While 
members of the middle class population would not be expected to migrate merely 
to obtain covered medical services in their younger years, they already do 
migrate at retirement age to more amenable climates and may well begin to do so 
if faced with the possibility of needing extended care in time to plan for it. 
T . 18 axpayers, too, can mlgrate. 
In contrast, under federal administration such migration could be a 
positive event. For instance, at this time, persons with arthritis and certain 
lung disorders consume expensive hospital and SNF care, but many are unable to 
take the simple expedient of moving to a state with a more therapeutic climate, 
such as Arizona. Under federal administration, they could move and be confi-
dent of retaining their eligibility for care. 
Ernest Saward lists four general types of economic regulations, all of 
which have been used in the health care field: (1) subsidization of individuals 
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4It or groups] as in Medicare and Hill-Burton; (2) quality control, as in accredi-
tations and PSRO's: (3) entry restrictions, as in licensure and more recently 
the certificate-of-need programs; and (4) rate or price regulation, as in 
Medicaid's fee schedules or Maxicap proposals. 19 It is clear that all of 
the regulations would be useless if all that need be done to avoid them was 
to leave the area. 
In testimony to a House subcommittee, a spokesman for Rhode Island argued 
that the nation needed to go beyond health policy to national financing be-
cause of the external blocks his state had encountered in establishing 
c 
universal health coverage. Since so many of Rhode Island's citizens work for 
out-of-state employers, the state was stymied in regulating the employers' 
health insurance rates and benefits?O Karen Davis supports the principle 
~ of regionalization along the natural market areas for health as marked out by the 
HSAs; she believes that strong roles for state governments in a. program of 
• 
national health insurance could interfere with this type of regional organization. 
For example, residents of eastern Arkansas may turn to Memphis for specialized 
health services, rather than Little Rock?l A federally-run program would· be 
best able to handle both these problems, because it would be freer to set guide-
lines wi thin state or HSA boundaries, or to transcend them when justified. 
Beca1Jse states compete, the federal government is now prone to overvalue 
equality (treating everyone the same, making no exceptions) at the expense of 
equity (making individual adjustments to achieve fairness). 
Finally, while it is true that if all states were to willingly act in 
concert, we would have a better chance of a successful cost containment program, 
it is unfortunately also true that most states cannot be relied on to imple-
ment creative cost containment measures on their own. Special interest 
groups, as discussed above, are more active at the state than the federal 
level. The record shows that virtually every major cost control mechanism 
• 
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has found its impetus, and often its inception, at the federal level. Out-
standing are Health Maintenance Organizations (HMO's) or pre-paid group 
practice; the Regional Medical Programs which preceded the HSAs, experimental 
reimbursement systems, Professional Standards Review Organizations (PSROs); 
and the National Health Service Corps to attract physicians to medically 
underserved areas. 
In contrast, the state record on cost containment is spotty~ Loebs 
describes the situation of utilization review through PSROs, intended to 
monitor both quality of care delivered and cost containment through uti1iza-
tion review of services to Medicaid clients. According to Loebs, tlDespi te 
the potential savings to the states through the implementation of a utili-
zation review system, about half of the states had no functioning utilization 
• review system before the local PSROs were organized. 22 In 1974, planning 
• 
legislation instituted the Certificate of Need program, under wnich a facility 
must demonstrate a real service need in its area for its projected establish-
ment or expansion. Prior to the legislation, most states took little action 
to control the needless and expensive proliferation of facilities which was 
going on. 23 
In summary, the evidence suggests that federal administrative control is 
the best mechanism Ior achieving the essential nationwide standards for poli~ 
cies in cost containment. 
A Federal Administration Would Be Efficient And Responsive 
Consider some of the findings on Medicaid reported to the House Subcommittee 
on Oversight and Investigations: 
1. Information (pertaining to surgical rates) as reported by 
states was "so inconsistent as to preclude any detailed 
• 
• 
• 
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analysis. lJ The Subcommittee could not determine, for 
example, if a rate decrease was an actual effect or due 
to differences in reporting. 
2. Data indicated a l6-fold difference in surgical rates 
between two states; also the rates for Medicaid as a whole 
b h f h f th 1 · 24 are a ove t e rates or t e rest 0 e popu atlon. 
3. States were unable to justify the necessity of the pro-
cedures. 
4. The Subcommittee viewed as particularly disturbing, the 
() 
inability of many states to be accurate and consistent 
~ to report at all. (Italics theirs.)25 
Although the Subcommittee faulted the Department of Health Education and 
Welfare (DHEW) for failing to require the states to submit the needed data, 
the principal blame for deficiencies in administration of the program was 
placed in the system itself: 
There is too great a division of labor and responsibility 
in the Medicaid program. This fosters a lack of accounta-
bility. The Federal Government helps finance and monitors 
the States" efforts. The states monitor their fiscal agents, 
whatever State agencies are responsible for health and wel-
fare. And, finally, the state agency often subcontracts 
with a private company for the actual administration of the 
program. Apart from but related to this chain of respon-
sibility, the Professional Standards Review Organizations 
CPSROs) are supposed to determine the necessity of elective 
procedures. To whom they are responsible remains unclear. 26 
Since the Subcommittee must deal with the system as it is presently 
structured, that is as a federal-state partnership, it recommended that 
DHEW develop and require use of uniform categories of reporting; that 
Congress tie funds to such reporting, and so on: a typical move toward 
• 
• 
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more control by mandate. Thus, in our system, if the federal government is 
dissatisfied with state performance, it has no choice but to create ever 
tighter restrictions in the use of its funds, combined with expensive 
systems for monitoring compliance, and threats of grant withdrawal as 
the motivating force. Such threats, it would seem, are likely to turn a 
partnership into a duel. Actually withholding funds is a serious decision 
which federal administrators do not like to make because they are aware of the 
dependence of state budgets on federal dollars. More importantly, the 
real victims of the "punishment" may be intended clients of the program, in 
this case, Medicaid eligibles in need of hospital, medical, or long-term 
care. Might it not be time, then, to streamline the handling and the 
accountability of the program in the fullest sense possible, that is, to 
allow the federal government to operate the program? 
The Director of the Indianapolis Urban League asserted to a House 
Subcommittee that no amount of tinkering with the federal, state, and private 
system can obscure the need for a single national health system trust fund 
operated by the federal government with input from general revenues, contribu-
'. 27 tory taxes, or a speclal surtax. One model suggested was proposed by the 
Committee for Economic Development. They advocated a tripartite national 
health insurance system using the existing employer funds and Medicare, with 
the rest being subsumed under Medicaid, and paid for by a special trust fund 
28 
overseen by Medicare. 
There is much to suggest the effectiveness of the federal government as 
administrator. It has experience in the provision of good quality acute and 
long-term care in the Veteran's Administration system. The VA has been 
• providing care to thousands of veterans--often the most indigent of veterans--
for fifty years, compiling, in those years, a relative absence of complaints. 
• 
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The VA also has experience in the purchase of care for veterans in community 
nursing homes. 
In the insurance industry, economists have found that Medicare is operated 
very inexpensively. Estimates are as low as 2-3 percent of overall operating 
expenses. 29 There is agreement that administrative costs may not be compa-
rable to private industry because of differences in populations served and in 
role requirements: private companies pay taxes and advertising, but Medicare 
has more extensive record-keeping. Also, estimates of efficiency would be 
expected to vary depending on whether costs are compared to number of benefits 
paid, total cost of benefits paid, and so forth. Nevertheless, even those 
who contend non-comparability means the public sector is not definitely more 
efficient admit that it means the private sector is not so, either. 30 Two 
~ economists who sought to carefully investigate insurance expenses by studying 
a variety of cost breakdowns determined that there are economies of scale in 
health insurance. 3l 
• 
A historical survey of legislation shows that Congress has classically 
been interested in good management. Five particular achievements will express 
the point. The first general legislation was the Civil Service Reform or 
Pendleton Act of 1883, considered to have formed the basis for American per-
sonnel administration. In 1912 came the "Report of the Commission on 
Economy and Efficiency: The Need for a National Budget", which led to the 
Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, creating the Budget Bureau, now the Office 
of Management and Budget. The New Deal passed legislation to create admini-
strative structures for the control of government-run businesses following a 
report submitted by Brownlow's Commission on Administrative Management. A 
significant legislation in 1946 called the Administrative Procedures Act 
addressed the need for more standardized procedures in the writing of bureau-
• 
• 
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cratic regulations which implement laws. Finally, the Hoover Commission in 
1949 made a study, with recoIT~endations, of the organization of the Executive 
branch of government which was subsequently adopted by the states as well as 
32 the federal government. 
Today the federal government collectively displays an almost overwhelming 
array of knowledge and skills, much of it directly concerning health care or 
the art of administration. 
--DHEW now has five separate offices concerned with some aspect of long-
term care or the aging, such as policy recommendations or maintenance of quality 
standards in nursing homes. 
The Monthly Catalog of U.S. government publications listed 17 titles 
relating to principles of good management, from January, 1978 to May, 1979 . 
--The Health Care Financing Administration is merging its Medicaid and 
Medicare Bureaus in 1979 to strengthen the programs now, and, in view of the 
interest in the issue, to develop preparedness in the event of a "universal" 
h 1 h . . h f 33 ea t Insurance program In te uture. 
Since we can onlX project what Medicaid might be like under full federal 
financing and administration, similar to Medicare's, it may be most fruitful 
to contrast the state experience in Medicaid with the federal experience in 
Medicare. 
Under Medicare, payments are made through selected private insurance 
companies, such as the Blue Cross plans, called intermediaries for Part A 
(Hospital), and carriers for Part B (Medical). Payments are prompt, made 
within four to six weeks, and are rarely reduced from the amount requested. 
Payment may be made either to the individual or directly to the provider . 
Eli"gibili ty is established by federal employees stationed in Social Securi ty 
offices. 
• 
• 
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Under Medicaid, payments are made by state or local jurisdictions in 
health or social services, or by a private company under contract with a 
state agency_ Eligibility is determined by state or local employees. 
Payment must be made directly to the p~ovider, who does not have the option 
of "topping off" the fee as set by the state. In a study of physicians"f' 
reactions to the Medicaid program in California, it was found a wait for 
payment can easily be one full year. Likewise, California physicians 
report high rates of unilateral and unexplained reductions in payment from 
the amounts requested. 34 The government obviously retains the right to re-
duce the level of payment from the amount requested by the,provider as a 
means of correcting bills submitted in error. However, reduction rates 
which exceed tolerance limits needlessly alienate providers and bespeak an 
administrative machinery in need of improvement. 
experiencing high rates of provider dropout. 
California is, in fact, 
While Medicare shows excellence in its handling of providers, Medicaid 
in some ways has a better track record of service to clients. Medicare's 
clients largely have status eligibility: one is either 65+ or not; further-
more, one may anticipate the arrival of one's eligibility threshold, the 65th 
birthday. Consequently, Medicare takes advantage of this and achieves some 
of its administrative cost-effectiveness by placing greater demands. on the 
resources of the applicant clients. With Medicare, any person seeking cover-
age is advised to apply three months in advance of her 65th birthday. However, 
the Medicaid population is chiefly characterized by a shifting, situational 
eligibility: the applicant may be a recently laid-off mother, a teenager who 
finds herself with an unwanted pregnancy, or a middle-income worker with a 
chronically-ill child needing extensive, but irregular and unpredictable, care. 
-136-
• Some of the permanently poor retain eligibility on an income basis but are 
careless about lire-certifying" their eligibility v.ntil a felt need for medi-
cal care arises. Not all of Medicaid is like this, of course. Many 
() 
people of long-standing poverty are quite careful about meeting expectations; 
the nursing home resident who first spends down her resources to become eligible, 
has then virtually a status eligibility, if she is not expected to be able 
to return to independent functioning. Nevertheless, Medicaid administration 
has been arranged such that a disorganized client who waits until the last 
minute to apply for coverage can still be at the doctor's office in a matter 
of days. 
Under a federally-run combined system, we would anticipate Medicaid's 
service to providers to be improved to the standards being maintained in 
• Medicare. We would expect the present difficulties caused by the inter-
actions between the two programs to be eliminated, and we would 'look for the 
program to demonstrate the responsiveness to clients presently shown by 
Medicare. 
An example of a ,problematic interaction between Medicaid and Medicare is 
the latter's 100 days' coverage in a nursing home. This 100 days often 
leads to administrative difficulties for government bureaucrats, nursing 
horne operators and patients alike in cases of dual eligibility, as state and 
federal administrators variously interpret the law regarding which level of 
government should take precedence for financial responsibility. If the 
structural tendency to competition to avoid the obligation were eliminated, the 
problem would disappear. A second administrative twist between the two pro-
• 
grams is the states' option to "buy-in" to Medicare for the Medicare-eligible 
Medicaid clients. These clients cannot afford to pay Medicare's cost for 
• 
• 
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themselves, and it would appear to be worthwhile to the states to pay their 
fees. Yet many states choose not to, even though the buy-in is not expensive. 
It may be that the administrati~e costs of the buy-in program are high enough 
to cause states to judge the potential gain to be insufficient. 
Finally, can a federally-run system adapt to meet the needs of a changing 
service population, as in the challenge of Medicaid? We would not expect 
such a program to be as inexpensively run as Medicare is now, but it will still 
be a step forward from the tangled mess of eligibility, accountability, re-
imbursement, appeals, audits, reporting and reviews which goes on at every 
intersection between two negotiating parties in the present Medicaid system . 
• 
• 
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